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In 2018, The Frick Collection, a museum featuring the private art 
collection of Henry Clay Frick and housed in the Frick family’s private
residence, finally received approval from the New York City 
Landmarks Preservation Commission to expand its physical footprint 
to accommodate its growing number of visitors. Official sanctioning of
the plan came after years of consternation, however, demonstrating the 
competing legal principles and conflicting interests that emerge when
collection museums seek to expand their physical structures. 
Collection museums, like the Frick, are institutions created from 
individuals’ private art collections that were themselves amassed to
found and open the museum. Because collection museums possess a 
defining characteristic—a physical arrangement that integrates 
artwork, interior design, physical building, and landscape—proposals
to alter or expand collection museums threaten to upset their unique 
aesthetic and experiential natures.  
To effectively balance the public’s right to express its interests with 
the collection museum’s autonomy to determine its institutional needs,
this Note assesses legal frameworks for understanding the complex 
intersection of interests that are raised by collection museums’
proposals to expand. Critical analysis of the trust framework, even 
when supplemented by nonlegal constraints, reveals its shortcomings.
Ultimately, a property-based framework emerges as the preferable
framework, capable of enfranchising the public while also maintaining 
a collection museum’s authority to make necessary alterations. 
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INTRODUCTION
Housed within one of New York City’s last remaining Gilded Age 
mansions is The Frick Collection (“the Frick”), a collection museum
that displays the world-renowned art of industrialist Henry Clay Frick.
However, the mansion itself merits the status of a work of art. Its 
Indiana limestone exterior, neoclassical architectural style, and
manicured viewing gardens establish an elegant presence and provide 
an oasis of contemplative solicitude in the midst of Manhattan. One 
feels at peace in the Frick’s gardens and in its intimate galleries, which 
remain arranged as they were when Henry Clay Frick and his family
resided there. Yet the mansion’s very intimacy—its limited size—has 
been a source of problems for the Frick.1 
In 2014, the Frick first announced plans to construct a new, six-
story building in one of the museum’s exterior gardens because the 
existing galleries were unable to accommodate the increased number 
of visitors, especially during special exhibitions and public lectures.2 
Though some applauded the expansion as a means of better providing 
for the public,3 the plan was vehemently opposed by many critics, who 
represented varied interests: some thought the renovation “would 
destroy the museum’s intimate aesthetic”; others believed that the 
garden space was “as prized as the art inside” and should not be razed.4 
In the wake of intense criticism from preservationists, artists, 
architects, neighbors, and coalitions like “Unite to Save the Frick,” the 
Frick abandoned the expansion plan in 2015.5 
1. Robin Pogrebin, Frick’s Expansion Is Approved by Landmarks Preservation Board, N.Y.
TIMES (June 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/arts/design/frick-collection-
expansion-approved.html [https://perma.cc/L7FM-KYP5] [hereinafter Pogrebin, Frick’s
Expansion Is Approved].
 2. Robin Pogrebin, Frick Seeks To Expand Beyond Jewel-Box Spaces, N.Y. TIMES (June 9,
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/arts/design/frick-plans-changes-but-vows-to-stay-the-
same.html [https://perma.cc/2U22-6SV3].
 3. See Peter Schjeldahl, Expanding the Frick: Let the Hard Hats Come, NEW YORKER (June 
16, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/expanding-the-frick-let-the-hard-
hats-come [https://perma.cc/7KBE-3ZP3] (arguing that expansion of the galleries “makes simple
sense”). 
4. Jennifer Smith, Flak over the Frick Collection’s Expansion Plans, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 11,
2014, 8:35 PM), http://webreprints.djreprints.com/3550920269999.html [https://perma.cc/P87K-
98SW].
 5. Pia Catton, Once Rebuffed, Frick Collection Restarts Its Expansion Push, WALL ST. J. 
(Mar. 24, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/once-rebuffed-frick-collection-restarts-its-
expansion-push-1458849635 [https://perma.cc/W9ES-22CY].
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After returning to the drawing board to account for criticisms of
the 2014 plan, the Frick announced a new expansion plan in 2018, 
which preserved and restored the museum’s 70th Street garden, 
repurposed nearly sixty thousand square feet of existing space, and 
added approximately twenty-seven thousand square feet of new 
construction.6 Despite the formation of a new coalition, “Stop 
Irresponsible Frick Development,” and criticism over the new plan, the 
Frick—a designated landmark—successfully obtained approval for the 
plan from the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission in 
June 2018, and construction is currently scheduled to begin in mid-to-
late 2020.7 
The Frick serves as a paradigmatic example of a collection 
museum—an institution created from an individual’s private art 
collection, which was itself amassed to open a museum.8 This definition
includes both collection museums that are housed in the former private 
home of the founding collector as well as museums that were designed 
according to the founding collector’s express specifications.9 In either
situation, a defining characteristic of a collection museum is the
collection’s physical arrangement. The integrated interaction among
the artworks, the interior design, the physical structure or building, and
the landscape setting complement one another, not only
contextualizing the founding collector’s artwork but also generating an
aesthetic of intimacy and a distinctive visitor experience.10 Because the
intimate impression generated by a collection museum depends upon, 
and is irrevocably shaped by, the integrative wholeness of its physical 
arrangement, a proposal to alter or expand a collection museum 
threatens to upset its unique aesthetic and experiential nature.  
6. FAQs, FRICK FUTURE, https://www.frickfuture.org/faqs [https://perma.cc/QD3D-
QX2G]. 
7. Pogrebin, Frick’s Expansion Is Approved, supra note 1; see also Victoria Stapley-Brown,
Nancy Kenney & Helen Stoilas, Met Plans To Leave Breuer Building, Making Way for the Frick, 
ART NEWSPAPER (Sept. 21, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/met-to-
leave-breuer-building-making-way-for-the-frick [https://perma.cc/6JMM-AAHJ] (explaining
that the Frick will take over space through a “sub-tenancy” with the Met and that construction
“is expected to start in mid- to late-2020”).
8. For an extensive explanation of collection museums, see generally ANNE HIGONNET, A
MUSEUM OF ONE’S OWN: PRIVATE COLLECTING, PUBLIC GIFT (2009).
 9. Id.
 10. See id. at 17 (categorizing museums as collection museums based on two core qualities: 
“[T]he personal character of the art collection and its even more personal installation”); Mission,
GLENSTONE, https://www.glenstone.org/about/mission [https://perma.cc/RCD8-85TE]
(describing Glenstone, a collection museum, as “a place that seamlessly integrates art,
architecture, and landscape into a serene and contemplative environment”).
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The proposal to expand the Frick is illustrative of the competing 
interests that are implicated when a collection museum seeks to alter 
or expand its physical structure. The plan galvanized many parties who 
vocalized competing needs and visions, including museum 
management, trustees, the founding collector’s descendants, artists, 
preservationists, architects, local governmental institutions, neighbors,
and the public. Additionally, the Frick’s expansion proposal history 
underscores the interplay and tension between the competing legal
principles of preservation and private property rights. Altering a
collection museum raises fundamental questions about the need to 
balance these two perspectives. In favor of preservation, the public has 
a genuine concern that changes to the structure might disrupt the
collection museum’s “unique place” in “culture, art, and
architecture.”11 At the same time, basic private property rights dictate 
that the museum’s management—the people “who manage the
institution [the building] houses, who come to know the building’s 
inadequacies . . . who feel the need to expand”12—should be able to 
alter the structure as necessary. At this confluence of competing legal
principles and competing interests, many questions abound: Whose 
interests and needs should control?13 Which iteration of a museum’s 
history should be preserved? How might the law be used to mediate 
among these often diverging parties? What legal framework should be 
applied? 
This contentious struggle between preservation and change—a
struggle that underlies a collection museum’s expansion and
potentially dictates its defining experiential nature—is further 
complicated by the hybrid public–private nature of collection 
museums. Originating as privately owned art collections displayed in 
private homes or other privately owned property, collection museums 
like the Frick were subsequently donated to the public as art 
museums.14 The public has an interest and important voice in the
11. See JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 50–51 (1999) (quoting Michael Benedict, Between Beakers
and Beatitudes: The Salk Institute’s Dual Role of Function and Landmark, PROGRESSIVE
ARCHITECTURE, Oct. 1993, at 52) (observing the competing interests The Salk Institute 
experienced).
 12. See id.
13. Of the Frick’s expansion, Director Ian Wardropper said: “What I find frustrating 
sometimes . . . is people seem to brush right by the needs of the museum.” Smith, supra note 4.
 14. See Buildings, FRICK COLLECTION, https://www.frick.org/about/buildings_and_galleries
[https://perma.cc/6DEH-XVBC] (noting it was Henry Clay Frick’s intention that his art collection
and home be opened as an art museum after his and his wife’s death).
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dialogue surrounding the expansion of collection museums, as the 
collection was given for its benefit and must operate with that mission
in mind.15 Some scholars even argue that the public has a droit 
patrimoine: a legal right to see and preserve its cultural inheritance, 
which could extend to participating in the means by which a museum 
manages and preserves its collection.16 Whether or not the public has a
legally cognizable right, collection museums nonetheless strive to 
attain the public’s trust, which requires “balancing public expectation 
with institutional needs.”17 Compounded with institutional mission
statements that portray museums as existing to serve the public,18 the
physical expansion of hybrid public–private collection museums 
complicates the private–public binary of property rights, which has 
significant implications for the governance of collection museums. 
This Note seeks to address and to critically assess potential legal
frameworks for understanding the complex intersection of interests 
that are raised by the expansion of collection museums, an area of art 
law scholarship that has yet to be fully analyzed. It argues that, of the 
potential legal solutions to be applied to collection museums’ 
expansion proposals, a property-based framework, particularly one 
manifested through historic preservation laws, is preferable because it 
most effectively balances the public’s right to express its interests with 
a collection museum’s autonomy in deciding how best to operate. Part 
I outlines the evolution of collection museums as hybrid public–private 
institutions and uses the Frick’s expansion proposal as an illustrative
example of the different parties implicated in proposals to expand such 
museums. Part II discusses the trust legal framework, a private 
governance model that is currently applied to evaluate the expansion
proposals of collection museums. This Part ultimately concludes that 
the trust framework, even supplemented by nonlegal, private-order 
15. But cf. Andrew McClellan, A Brief History of the Art Museum Public, in ART AND ITS
PUBLICS: MUSEUM STUDIES AT THE MILLENNIUM 1, 1 (Andrew McClellan ed., 2003) (“[T]here
is no one public for art; the public for art is diverse . . . .”).
 16. See John Nivala, Droit Patrimoine: The Barnes Collection, the Public Interest, and
Protecting Our Cultural Inheritance, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 477, 480–81 (2003) (discussing the 
public’s droit patrimoine in the context of public access to the renowned Barnes Foundation).
17. Glenn D. Lowry, A Deontological Approach to Art Museums and the Public Trust, in
WHOSE MUSE? ART MUSEUMS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST 129, 145 (James Cuno ed., 2006).
18. For example, the Frick’s mission is “[t]o preserve and display for the public the
Collection[,] . . . [t]o provide access, understanding, and enjoyment of the Collection to the 
public[,] . . . [t]o offer a singular and memorable experience for the visiting public[,] . . . [and t]o
serve as a center for research and to stimulate scholarship.” About the Frick Collection, FRICK
COLLECTION, https://www.frick.org/about [https://perma.cc/W8QT-9RJG] (emphasis added).
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governance mechanisms, fails to balance the needs of both museum
management and the public sufficiently. Part III discusses the public 
governance alternative, which is grounded in property law, and several 
property-based legal doctrines for evaluating collection museums’ 
renovation plans, arguing that the property-based legal framework is 
the preferable model. Specifically, it posits that historic preservation 
orders provide the most suitable doctrinal solution for addressing the 
particular challenges raised in the collection museum context. Part IV 
offers proposals for improving existing historic preservation 
ordinances and discusses the implications of these proposals for 
collection museums. 
I. OVERVIEW OF COLLECTION MUSEUMS
This Part provides a framework for understanding the distinctive 
concerns that a collection museum encounters when presenting a
proposal to expand and alter the museum’s physical and contextual 
integrity. Specifically, this Part discusses the history of collection
museums and their changing nature as private institutions in service of 
the public. It then details the various stakeholders implicated in
proposals to expand collection museums.
A. Defining a Museum and Origins of the Museum in Service of the 
Public 
The International Council of Museums (“ICOM”) defines a 
museum as “a non-profit, permanent institution in the service of society
and its development, open to the public, which acquires, conserves, 
researches, communicates and exhibits . . . for the purposes of
education, study and enjoyment.”19 Perhaps the most striking feature of 
this definition is its emphasis on the museum’s service to society or the 
public more generally. 
The concept of a public museum traces its origins to the 
establishment of the Musée du Louvre in 1793.20 In the United States, 
the 1870s witnessed the founding of several municipal museums, 
institutions founded by American local governments that were based 
upon the public museum model established by the Louvre.21 These
19. ICOM Definition of a Museum, INT’L COUNCIL MUSEUMS (Oct. 7, 2008),
http://archives.icom.museum/definition.html [https://perma.cc/5BED-YTXL] (emphasis added). 
20. See HIGONNET, supra note 8, at 5 (describing the establishment of the national public
museum as a “radical concept[] of the French Revolution”).
 21. Id.
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museums were demonstrably public museums, often built on public 
land and with public money.22 
In contrast to these public municipal museums, several private
individuals founded collection museums in the early twentieth century. 
These institutions included the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum, the
Frick, The Huntington Library, Art Collections, and Botanical 
Gardens, and Dumbarton Oaks.23 Though these privately owned art 
collections were displayed in the homes of their collectors, these art 
collections and the buildings that housed them were intended to be
intimately linked and to become public museums.24 Collection
museums thus seemed to constitute an inherent contradiction as 
collectors sought to donate to the public for the public use but did so
through “[t]he ultimate private property”—their private homes, which 
housed their private art collections.25 Simultaneously a private home
and a public institution, the collection museum occupied a liminal 
position from its founding, complicating the public–private binary of
art museum classification.  
Organizationally, art museums may be categorized as public or 
private. Public museums include federal and state museums, museums 
created by local governments, and museums affiliated with state
universities.26 By contrast, private museums are created by private 
individuals as charitable trusts, unincorporated associations, or
nonprofit corporations.27 As manifestations of private individuals’ 
donations, collection museums are quintessentially private entities.
Yet the public–private museum categorization is not a bright line; 
many private museums may still receive government support vis-à-vis 
federal income tax exemptions as § 501(c)(3) organizations.28 
Nevertheless, this public–private distinction does have profound 
22. See id.
 23. Id. at 13–14, 16. 
24. Id. at 92. 
25. Id. at 96. 
26. MARILYN E. PHELAN, MUSEUM LAW: A GUIDE FOR OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, AND 
COUNSEL 4 (4th ed. 2014) [hereinafter PHELAN, MUSEUM LAW: A GUIDE]. 
27. Given their educational purpose, private museums are generally exempt from federal 
income tax under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 4, 6.
28. The Internal Revenue Code provides that “[c]orporations, and any community chest,
fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing 
for public safety, literary, or educational purposes” are exempt from federal income tax. I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (2018). Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) lists examples of organizations that
are organized and operated exclusively for educational purposes—example 4 specifically lists
“[m]useums” as qualifying organizations. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) (2018).
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implications for the governance and regulation of collection museums. 
Public museums are subject to governmental control and regulation, 
whereas private museums are principally constrained by their own 
internal organizational documents, such as mission statements and 
internal policies that define their organizational structure and museum 
governance.29 
Recent shifts in perception of private museums as institutions in 
service of the public have only complicated whether a museum’s 
regulatory control lies with the government or with the museum itself.30 
During the second half of the twentieth century, art museums shifted
their focus from collections and preservation to public service.31 In 
addition, during the 1970s, museum directors and academics began to
explore the question: Who owns the museum?32 As a result of art 
museums’ self-reflection and redefinition as institutions in service of 
the public, many began to demand increased accountability from
museums, trustees, and professional staff.33 Even in the twenty-first
century, when art museums continue to be “more popular than ever 
before,” museums, including their trustees and directors, remain 
“more at risk and are more vulnerable to public criticism than ever 
before.”34 Although museums acknowledge that maintaining the public 
trust and confidence “implies both a set of responsibilities . . . and a 
code of conduct[,] . . . there is very little that defines what constitutes 
acting within the public trust . . . [so] it is up to individual art museums”
to self-regulate.35 In other words, despite the “nature and foundation
29. See MARILYN PHELAN, MUSEUMS AND THE LAW 1 (1982) [hereinafter PHELAN,
MUSEUMS AND THE LAW] (discussing governance structures for private museums).
 30. See Kenneth Hudson, The Museum Refuses To Stand Still, MUSEUM INT’L, Jan. 1998, at
43 (observing, in 1998, that “the most fundamental change that has affected museums during the
[last] half-century . . . is the now almost universal conviction that they exist in order to serve the
public”).
 31. See Stephen E. Weil, From Being About Something to Being for Somebody: The Ongoing 
Transformation of the American Museum, DAEDALUS, Summer 1999, at 236 (referencing the
public-service rhetoric of ICOM and the American Alliance of Museums in defining “museum”).
 32. Peter Temin, An Economic History of American Art Museums, in THE ECONOMICS OF
ART MUSEUMS 179, 184 (Martin Feldstein ed., 1991). For example, Karl E. Meyer argued that a 
museum—that is, its trustees—does not own the art but rather is the steward of the art; the owner
of the art is the public. Id.
 33. See Hudson, supra note 30, at 43 (observing that the public was no longer content to have
its leisure time controlled by the elite, and people were “increasingly demanding a say in the 
planning and organization of what they choose to do”).
 34. See James Cuno, Introduction to WHOSE MUSE? ART MUSEUMS AND THE PUBLIC 
TRUST, supra note 17, at 11.
 35. Lowry, supra note 17, at 133–35. 
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of the public purpose of art museums” being well established,36 private 
museums remain “fundamentally a self-regulated . . . sphere of our
society” managed only by internally developed governance structures 
in which the public may not be involved.37 
The resulting mismatch between the public purpose of private 
museums and their private governance structure raises several 
practical concerns about the ability of these museums to account for, 
and respond to, the public’s needs effectively. If private museums aim 
and exist to serve the public, it stands to reason that the public’s 
concerns should be sufficiently represented. But can a private 
governance system be modified to account for the public’s interest? If 
so, then how can a governance scheme balance a private museum’s 
autonomy to effectuate its mission and meet its institutional needs with
the public’s right to participate in critical museum decisions? 
Although scholarship has addressed the competing interests of 
museum management and the public in the context of deaccessioning 
art collections,38 little scholarship has addressed the converse problem:
when a museum seeks to expand its architectural structure and change 
its surrounding landscapes.39 Museum architecture “is integral to the
museum experience,”40 especially for collection museums, where the 
defining characteristic is the physical and contextual integrity of the
36. See Cuno, supra note 34, at 11 (discussing the public’s view of art museums).
 37. See James N. Wood, The Authorities of the American Art Museum, in  WHOSE MUSE?
ART MUSEUMS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST, supra note 17, at 103, 116 (discussing the internal
independence of museums and how that independence may not undermine the public trust).
38. Deaccessioning is a process “by which a work of art or other object . . . , wholly or in part,
is permanently removed from a museum’s collection.” ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., AAMD
POLICY ON DEACCESSIONING 1 (2015), https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/AAMD% 
20Policy%20on%20Deaccessioning%20website_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LZF-6GMQ]
[hereinafter AAMD POLICY]. For scholarship addressing the competing interests in
deaccessioning, see generally Sue Chen, Art Deaccessions and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty, 14
ART ANTIQUITY & L. 103, 104 & nn.3–9 (2009) (collecting recent examples of scholarship on art-
deaccessioning policies).
39. In some manner, the renovation of collection museums presents the flip side of the 
deaccessioning problem—the museum wants to expand, rather than contract or substitute, its
collection and facilities. Yet in a different sense, the expansion of a collection museum manifests
as the ultimate act of deaccessioning: the museum may compromise the integrity of its building
structure—an integral aspect of collection museum experience—to facilitate the museum’s
expansion, just as a museum might sell one work of art in order to purchase a different work of 
art. Moreover, if one perceives the collection museum’s building as a work of art in its own right,
the proposal to expand or alter the original structure further resembles an act of deaccessioning.
 40. Susanna Sirefman, Formed and Forming: Contemporary Museum Architecture, 
DAEDALUS, Summer 1999, at 297, 318.
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artwork, interior design, building, and setting.41 Furthermore, for many
collection museums, the building itself could be perceived as a work of 
art in its own right. Examples abound of criticism and backlash in 
response to a collection museum’s announcement to alter or expand its 
architecture.42 For collection museums, the stakes of altering the 
physical structure may be even higher. In particular, a collection
museum’s management might be more constrained than their public 
museum colleagues due to the collection museum’s distinctive
experience, which derives from the integrative nature of the museum’s 
artwork, interior spaces, physical building, and surrounding landscape,
all of which, to some extent, were personally curated by the founder.
Furthermore, the collection museum’s architecture and landscape
contextualize the founder’s art collection and may be “the primary
artifacts preserved, maintained, and interpreted for the public.”43 Thus,
any proposal to alter a collection museum’s architecture or physical 
surroundings inevitably implicates this experiential quality of
collection museums, which, in turn, precipitates responses from varied 
parties. 
B. Stakeholders Involved in Collection Museums 
Because the expansion of a collection museum raises concerns for 
varied parties, it is productive to identify some of these stakeholders, 
which, in turn, highlights the larger public–private tensions
surrounding a museum’s proposal. As discussed above, the Frick’s 
recent expansion proposal serves as a paradigmatic example of the 
41. See id. at 297 (arguing that a museum’s architecture represents its “public image, defines
the [museum’s] relationship to its setting, and constructs the framework of the visitors’ 
experience”).
42. For examples of expansion proposals by museums other than collection museums, see 
Sarah Cascone, Tennis Legend Billie Jean King Is Leading a Rally To Protest the American
Museum of Natural History’s Expansion, ARTNET NEWS (Feb. 1, 2019), https://news.artnet.com/ 
art-world/american-museum-natural-history-expansion-protest-1454854 [https://perma.cc/36EL-
UJ4H] (discussing the dispute between the American Museum of Natural History in New York
and a coalition, “Community United to Protect Theodore Roosevelt Park,” over the museum’s
2016 plan to construct on a city park) and Corey Levitan, Architects Challenge Expansion of 
Museum of Contemporary Art San Diego’s La Jolla Campus, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Aug. 12, 
2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/entertainment/visual-arts/sd-et-visual-
museum-protest-20180807-story.html [https://perma.cc/PD7S-4QQB] (discussing the 2018
petition signed by architects to forestall the expansion of the Museum of Contemporary Art San
Diego, even after the plan had been approved by the City of San Diego Planning Commission). 
43. Thompson M. Mayes, When Buildings and Landscapes Are the Collection (ALI-ABA
Continuing Legal Education, Apr. 2016), SX006 ALI-ABA 191 (describing the importance of
architecture and landscape in the context of historic house museums and historic sites).
















    
 
    
     
   
   





2020] CONSTRUCTING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK 1401
many stakeholders involved in an expansion proposal as well as the
competing interests implicated by such a proposal. 
One key stakeholder is the collection museum’s management, 
such as the director and board of trustees, who are principally 
responsible for determining if and when a collection museum should
expand, for selecting the plan’s architect, and for obtaining the
necessary building permits and approvals. In the case of the Frick, its 
trustees and director were heavily involved in the process: initiating the
expansion plan in 2014; withdrawing the plan in 2015; submitting a new 
plan in 2018; and obtaining approval from the New York City
Landmarks Preservation Commission.44 
Another key stakeholder is the founding collector. Although
collectors amassed their collections with the intention of creating 
public museums, adjustments were inevitably required to transform a
private home into a forum that could accommodate public visitors. 
Some founding collectors personally undertook this transition,45 while
others left wills46 specifying their wishes, which were then carried out 
by their descendants and trustees, many of whom were also 
descendants of the founding collector. Although Henry Clay Frick, the 
founder of the Frick, died in 1919, his descendants have played a key 
role throughout the Frick’s history by serving as trustees. These 
descendants also vocalized their concerns about the proposed 
expansion plans for the Frick at public hearings and participated in
coalitions organized to stop the Frick’s expansion, which they viewed
as threatening the Frick’s unique experiential nature by “turn[ing the 
Frick] into another commercial New York art museum.”47 
Preservationists, artists, and architects represent a third type of 
stakeholder in collection museum’s expansion. These individuals may 
be particularly invested in articulating concerns about proposals that 
44. See supra notes 2–7 and accompanying text.
 45. See, e.g., History: America’s First Museum of Modern Art, The PHILLIPS COLLECTION, 
https://www.phillipscollection.org/about/history [https://perma.cc/XP3Y-7PRD] (discussing how
Duncan Phillips, founder of The Phillips Collection, served as museum director from 1921 to his
death in 1966 and was responsible for adding a modernist wing to the collection in 1960). 
46. See, e.g., Anne Hawley & Alexander Wood, A Sketch of the Life of Isabella Stewart
Gardner, in ISABELLA STEWART GARDNER MUSEUM: DARING BY DESIGN 1, 53 (Anne Hawley, 
Robert Campbell & Alexander Wood eds., 2004) (describing Isabella Stewart Gardner’s will, 
which left her art collection and assets to The Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum and specified
that the installation of her art collection could never be changed). 
47. Martha Frick Symington Sanger, Don’t Let The Frick Disappear, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/opinion/dont-let-the-frick-disappear.html [https://perma.cc/
R9NR-26VD].
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alter a collection museum’s architecture and landscape, both of which
may be of historical and aesthetic significance. Indeed, immense
criticism for the 2014 Frick proposal came from such stakeholders, who 
were particularly critical of the proposal to build a six-story building 
because it would have eliminated one of the Frick’s prized viewing 
gardens and mitigated the Frick’s architectural aesthetic by embedding 
the museum “in a continuous street wall.”48 
A fourth category of stakeholder consists of neighboring private 
property owners, who may have an interest in the expansion if it 
impacts their property values and enjoyment of their property. In the
case of the Frick’s 2014 proposal, local neighbors objected because they 
would lose their views of the Frick’s garden; their criticisms also 
centered on the aesthetic appeal of the Frick and the historical 
character it contributed to the neighborhood.49 
A fifth stakeholder is local government, which through zoning 
boards or historic preservation boards may be involved in the process 
by requiring approval or permits for an expansion. Certainly the New 
York City Landmarks Preservation Commission played an 
instrumental role in the Frick’s expansion process because it had to
vote to approve the plan.50 Last, but not least, the public for whose
benefit a collection museum was founded certainly has a stake in the 
expansion of collection museums. In response to the Frick’s expansion 
proposals, members of the public organized into coalitions and groups, 
such as “Unite to Save the Frick” and “Stop Irresponsible Frick
Development,” to vocalize their interests in curbing the expansion of 
the museum.
Many stakeholders may be involved in the collection museum’s 
expansion proposal and may exert varying degrees of influence on the 
process. Although the Frick’s museum management possessed a large 
measure of exclusive autonomy in the expansion proposal process, it 
was committed to addressing stakeholders’ criticisms. For example, 
between the announcement of its plan in April 2018 and the 
48. Smith, supra note 4. One landscape conservator expressed that “it would be a very, very 
great shame” to destroy the Frick’s viewing garden. Id. (quoting Elizabeth Barlow Rogers,
president of the Foundation for Landscape Studies and founder of the Central Park
Conservancy).
 49. See id. (stating that the garden can be viewed by the public from 70th Street and that
critics thought the new gallery space would not compensate for the loss). 
50. See Pogrebin, Frick’s Expansion Is Approved, supra note 1 (describing how the New
York City Landmarks Preservation Commission approved the plan by a vote of six to one after
denying a previous plan).
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Landmarks Preservation Commission’s review of the plan in May 2018, 
the Frick met with around seventy-five community organizations and
others to present the project and receive feedback.51 As Director Ian
Wardropper stated, “The public process can be painful, but we listened 
and I think the [Frick’s expansion] project is better because of that.”52 
Thus, the Frick’s expansion history highlights not only the many parties 
implicated in expansion proposals to collection museums but also 
demonstrates the value derived from collaboration between museum
management and outside stakeholders. Moreover, the Frick’s 
expansion history demonstrates the significant role that local 
government may play in facilitating opportunities for the public to
express their concerns, such as through public hearings. Additionally, 
through zoning commissions and preservation boards, local 
government can provide an effective institutional check on collection 
museums. 
More generally, the law can—and should—function as a means of 
mediating among the multivalent needs and critiques that a collection 
museum may encounter in the wake of a proposal to expand. An
effective legal framework should facilitate conversations and decisions 
that balance museum management’s authority to discern its needs and 
implement plans to effectuate its mission with the public’s interest in, 
and enjoyment of, a collection museum. 
II. THE CURRENT APPROACH: THE TRUST LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Collection museums can be governed by a number of possible 
legal frameworks. This Part discusses the current regime of private 
museum and collection museum governance: the trust framework. As 
this Part will explain, despite its current application to collection
museums, the trust framework is complicated by corporate law and
possesses shortcomings that fail to balance the competing interests and
needs of museum management and the public successfully. Even if the 
trust framework were supplemented by a museum’s own nonlegal, self-
imposed constraints, this Note argues that the current trust-based 
governance regime insufficiently accounts for the public’s interests,
which indicates a need to impose a new legal framework.  
51. Robin Pogrebin, Frick Collection, with Fourth Expansion Plan, Crosses Its Fingers Again,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/arts/design/frick-collection-
expansion-selldorf.html [https://perma.cc/XY6R-X8QP].
 52. Pogrebin, Frick’s Expansion Is Approved, supra note 1.
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A. The Shortcomings of the Trust Framework of Care in the 
Collection Museum Context 
Collection museums, like most private museums, are nonprofit 
charitable corporations.53 Despite collection museums’ corporate
status, their governance is vested in a board of trustees, who must act 
in the public interest.54 Trustees are fiduciaries and thus owe certain
duties to the beneficiary, which, in the case of a collection museum, is 
the public that the museum serves.55 Fiduciaries may be held liable for 
negligence in the performance of their duties.56 If a collection
museum’s trustees and management propose an expansion that 
breaches their fiduciary duties to the public, the trustees and
management could be held liable. However, the standard of care that
subjects trustees to liability may vary, depending upon whether courts 
apply the corporate law standard—the business judgment rule—or the 
trust law standard—the trust standard of care. 
As a result, an initial complication is whether corporate law or 
trust law governs a collection museum. A charitable trust will be 
subject to the trust standard, which holds a trustee liable for ordinary
negligence, whereas a nonprofit corporation that is not charitable in
nature will be subject to the corporate standard, which holds a trustee 
liable only for gross negligence.57 Since most collection museums are
charitable nonprofit corporations, these museums do not squarely fall
under either the charitable trust or corporate category, providing a 
court with discretion to select the standard to be applied to trustees.58 
53. PHELAN, MUSEUM LAW: A GUIDE, supra note 26, at 9; see also  MARIE C. MALARO,
MUSEUM GOVERNANCE: MISSION, ETHICS, POLICY 3 (1994) [hereinafter MALARO, MUSEUM
GOVERNANCE] (“Most cultural organizations are nonprofit entities chartered within a particular
state to carry out a charitable (that is, educational) purpose.”).
 54. MALARO, MUSEUM GOVERNANCE, supra note 53, at 3. For example, the Frick is a not-
for-profit corporation organized under the laws of New York with a board of trustees.
 55. See  PHELAN, MUSEUMS AND THE LAW, supra note 29, at 154 (stating that trustees of
charitable organizations owe duties “to the public at large”). Trustees owe a duty of loyalty, a
duty of care, a “duty not to delegate to others the administration of the trust or the performance 
of acts in the administration of the trust,” and a duty “to keep clear and accurate accounts.” Id.
at 155–56. 
56. PHELAN, MUSEUM LAW: A GUIDE, supra note 26, at 20.
 57. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (holding that the standard of care
under the business judgment rule is gross negligence). 
58. See PHELAN, MUSEUM LAW: A GUIDE, supra note 26, at 20 (explaining the uncertainty
regarding the fiduciary standards that can be applied to a nonprofit charitable organization).
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Currently, courts tend to apply the business judgment rule to
determine the liability of trustees and directors of private museums.59 
Under the business judgment rule, the court presumes that the director 
acted with due care; even if the presumption is rebutted, the director 
will only be held liable for gross negligence.60 From the perspective of 
museum management, the business judgment rule appears preferable 
because judicial review leaves the substantive concerns of a collection 
museum’s expansion within the judgment of museum professionals and
trustees, who are far more knowledgeable on the matter than the 
courts. Problematically, however, this standard endows the board with 
expansive authority and minimal accountability, and it provides a 
measure of immunity to directors and trustees.61 
In the context of a collection museum’s expansion proposal,
application of the business judgment rule proves an ineffective check
for many reasons. First, many collection museums are nonprofit 
corporations: their “shareholders”—the public—“have neither voting
power nor standing to sue” the museum’s director or board on the basis 
of an uninformed business decision.62 Second, since the rule presumes 
prudent decision-making by directors and boards, a contestant’s 
evidence of breach of the duty of care only rebuts the presumption. By 
not subjecting the director and board to automatic liability, the 
business judgment rule proves to be an impotent check on officer and
director discretion. Third, the rule ensures compliance with the 
decision-making process, but it does not normally question the
substantive merits of a decision.63 In other words, the court focuses on
the means of the decision rather than the substantive ends and content 
of that decision, which is the chief concern for proposed alterations and
expansions to collection museums. Finally, application of a corporate
standard to collection museums threatens their public credibility: “The 
59. Id. at 20–21.
 60. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (“It is a presumption that in making a business decision the 
directors [and board members] of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”).
 61. See Lori McMillan, The Business Judgment Rule as an Immunity Doctrine, 4 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 521, 574 (2013) (concluding that because the business judgment rule has the 
same policy foundations, procedures, and effects as an immunity rule, it stands to reason that the
business judgment rule is itself a form of immunity).
 62. Chen, supra note 38, at 119. 
63. The business judgment rule requires courts “to focus on procedural due care”—the 
means by which the director reached the decision—rather than substantive due care—the merits
of the director’s decision. Bernard S. Sharfman, The Importance of the Business Judgment Rule, 
14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 27, 53 (2017) (emphasis added).
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more art museums look like multinational corporations and the more 
their directors sound like corporate CEOs, the more they risk being
cast by the public in the same light.”64 
Arguably, courts reviewing the actions of museum trustees and 
directors for alleged breaches of fiduciary duties to the public could 
instead apply the trust standard of care—a more meaningful standard 
that holds management liable for ordinary, and not just gross, 
negligence. Yet even the trust standard of care may prove insufficient 
because the law limits the enforcement of fiduciary obligations through 
standing doctrines. Specifically, the public and donors do not have 
standing to sue a charitable trust or nonprofit charitable corporation 
for breach of their fiduciary duties.65 Instead, the state attorney general 
has primary responsibility for enforcing charitable trusts and
overseeing their trustees.66 
State attorneys general present a pragmatic enforcement solution 
for charitable trusts. Although the public possesses “a substantial
interest in the enforcement of a charitable trust” as the beneficiary of 
the trust, “it would be impractical to expect individual members of the 
public to police trust activity.”67 Furthermore, limiting enforcement to 
the state attorney general affords museum management the autonomy
to act in the institution’s best interest without being constantly 
bombarded by the public’s demands while simultaneously maintaining 
a sufficient level of oversight by the attorney general.68 Finally, state
attorneys general have effectively monitored collection museums 
previously.69 
64. Cuno, supra note 34, at 16.
 65. PHELAN, MUSEUM LAW: A GUIDE, supra note 26, at 28–30. 
66. Id. at 30 (stating that the attorney general “generally” represents the public in ensuring
that trustees properly perform their duties and that in “most states,” only the attorney general
can bring a suit to enforce charitable trusts); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391
(AM. LAW. INST. 1959) (giving the attorney general, among others, the power to maintain a suit
“for the enforcement of a charitable trust”).
 67. MARIE C. MALARO, A LEGAL PRIMER ON MANAGING MUSEUM COLLECTIONS 20 
(1985) [hereinafter MALARO, A LEGAL PRIMER].
 68. See id. (quoting at length from Dickey v. Volker, 11 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Mo. 1928) (en banc),
and People ex rel. Ellert v. Cogswell, 45 P. 270, 271 (Cal. 1896), as expressions of the rule that
attorneys general are the representatives of the public that oversee how public charities and trusts
are managed).
 69. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barnes Found., 159 A.2d 500, 505–06 (Pa. 1960) (finding the 
Barnes Foundation’s trustees had violated the indenture between Dr. Barnes and the Foundation
and ordering the public to receive access to the Foundation with continued oversight by the 
attorney general); see also SAX, supra note 11, at 76 (discussing the Barnes Foundation case and 
its implications for public rights to art collections).
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Despite the merits of limiting enforcement to the state attorney 
general, there is a “gap between the attorney general’s theoretical and 
practical powers of enforcement.”70 For instance, although centralizing 
oversight of charitable trusts in a single entity appears to be an efficient 
solution, an attorney general may not realistically have the time or 
resources to monitor and enforce trust standards, which may result in 
“little effective legal regulation of museum trustees.”71 As a result,
trustees may “exercise the rights of ownership with little interference 
from the public.”72 By extension, the current enforcement mechanism 
divests the ordinary individuals of any oversight authority, essentially 
leaving the public with “almost no power to control activities of
nonprofit directors.”73 
Although imposing the trust standard of care on a museum’s 
director and board members would be preferable to the current trend 
of imposing the more lax business judgment rule, the trust standard of 
care itself possesses a problematic enforcement mechanism, rendering
the public powerless to enforce the fiduciary obligations of a museum’s 
director and board members.  
B. Problems with Fixing the Trust Standard of Care  
Although the current trust framework does not adequately 
account for the public’s interest in proposed expansions to a collection 
museum, the current framework could be redressed through legal and 
nonlegal proposals. Even so, this Section details how these proposals 
nevertheless fail to redress fully the shortcomings of the trust 
framework. 
As a legal matter, the class who has standing to sue a collection 
museum for breach of its fiduciary duties to the public could be 
expanded in scope.74 In the museum context, litigants have already 
lobbied courts to recognize the standing of historical societies and 
70. STEPHEN E. WEIL, Breaches of Trust, Remedies, and Standards in the American Private
Art Museum, in BEAUTY AND THE BEASTS: ON MUSEUMS, ART, THE LAW, AND THE MARKET
160, 166–67 (1983).
71. John Henry Merryman, Are Museum Trustees and the Law out of Step?, ARTNEWS, Nov.
1975, at 24, 26. 
72. Temin, supra note 32, at 184.
 73. PHELAN, MUSEUM LAW: A GUIDE, supra note 26, at 28.
 74. See MALARO, A LEGAL PRIMER, supra note 67, at 22–29 (describing efforts to expand 
the concept of standing to sue nonprofit organizations and museum cases involving standing
issues). 
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former trustees seeking to enjoin a museum’s deaccessioning efforts.75 
Yet this legal solution proves untenable for several reasons. First, 
conferring standing on additional persons generates difficult line-
drawing questions and policy judgments about whose interests matter 
most.76 Second, further line-drawing questions arise in deciding which
types of decisions by trustees and directors could and should be open
to challenge. At the extreme, any member of the public could sue a
collection museum for any decision, large or small, thereby thwarting 
the efficiency of a collection museum in meeting its goals as well as
deterring individuals from becoming trustees. 
As an additional legal-based proposal to rectify the trust 
framework’s shortcomings, the United States could create an
independent government agency that exclusively supervises American 
charities, based upon international models. For example, the Charity 
Commission for England and Wales, an independent agency
accountable to Parliament, supervises charities.77 Creating an 
independent government agency to supervise American charities could 
not only redress the current gap between a state attorney general’s 
theoretical and practical enforcement powers but also would provide
more specialized expertise on the particular demands and needs of
charitable organizations and collection museums. Nonetheless, this 
proposal seems unlikely, as it would require a massive bureaucratic 
undertaking and could generate additional pragmatic and financial 
burdens. 
A more promising and politically viable proposal to address the 
shortcomings of the current trust framework could come from 
nonlegal, private-ordering mechanisms that are developed and 
promulgated by museums. Examples of such mechanisms include 
professional ethics codes and standards developed by museum
associations, self-regulation by collection museums through policies 
and mission statements, and public opinion. 
75. See id. at 25–28 (discussing cases such as Rowan v. Pasadena Art Museum, No. C 322817
(Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 1981), which denied standing to former trustees).  
76. It is unclear exactly to whom should standing be extended: Should donors and their heirs,
neighboring private property owners, taxpayers, or merely any museum visitor be allowed to
bring suit? See, e.g., Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 159, 163 (2011) (noting that some scholars “complain that standing exacerbates existing
inequalities in politics and society more broadly”).
 77. About Us, CHARITY COMMISSION FOR ENG. & WALES, https://www.gov.uk/government/ 
organisations/charity-commission/about [https://perma.cc/FXU6-52J4].
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Professional ethical standards can—and often do—set higher 
standards than those required by law.78 Organizations like the 
Association of Art Museum Directors (“AAMD”) and the Alliance of
American Museums (“AAM”) currently provide standards and ethical 
codes for member museums.79 Such standards and codes could be
revised to include more robust recommendations and policies for 
museum modification as well as for collection-museum-specific 
expansion proposals.However, professional ethics code revisions alone
are insufficient because they are not legally binding on collection 
museums and their effectiveness depends on self-regulation.80 
In addition, collection museums, and museums generally, could
develop policies for expansion of their physical buildings and 
alterations to their surrounding landscapes through nonlegal, private 
governance models. The AAMD and AAM currently have such 
policies for instances such as deaccessioning.81 These policies could be
expanded to include a collection museum’s physical building and 
landscape setting.82 Though collection museum policies regarding 
78. Id.
79. For example, AAMD’s Professional Practices in Art Museums recognizes that a
museum’s “physical plant is among the assets of the museum for which the board assumes
ultimate responsibility” and recommends that directors should submit facilities plans,
development concepts, designs, and other documents to the board for review and approval. ASS’N 
OF ART MUSEUM DIRS., PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES IN ART MUSEUMS 13 (2011),
https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/2011ProfessionalPracitiesinArtMuseums.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E2H9-KE8N]. This provision could be expanded to specifically include the public’s
input for expansion proposals, such as through mandated public hearings.
 80. See MALARO, MUSEUM GOVERNANCE, supra note 53, at 17 (arguing that ethical codes 
have no enforcement mechanism and instead “depend on self-education, self-motivation, and
peer pressure for their promulgation” and “cannot be effective without a consistent and voluntary 
commitment from a sizable portion of the profession”).
81. Press Release, Am. All. of Museums, Statement on the Deaccessioning by the Delaware
Art Museum and the Action Taken by the AAM Accreditation Commission (June 18, 2014),
https://www.aam-us.org/2014/06/18/statement-on-the-deaccessioning-by-the-delaware-art-museum-
and-the-action-taken-by-the-aam-accreditation-commission [https://perma.cc/RR3Y-79W6]
[hereinafter AAM Press Release] (announcing a unanimous vote to remove the Delaware Art 
Museum’s accredited status after its board decided to deaccession and sell works from its 
collection for impermissible purposes under the AAM Code of Ethics for Museums).
82. For example, the Preamble to the AAMD Policy on Deaccessioning specifically
underscores that “[e]xpressions of donor intent should always be respected in deaccession
decisions and the interests of the public, for whose benefit collections are maintained, must always
be foremost in making deaccession decisions.” AAMD POLICY, supra note 38. These concerns— 
honoring the founding collector’s intentions for his or her museum and serving the public—should
also be foremost when a collection museum decides to expand or alter its physical building or
surroundings, a strong argument for expanding this policy to address collection-museum-specific
issues. 
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physical modification would present an ideal solution, this strategy has 
a few shortcomings. First, these policies would still need to be 
developed and devised; in the interim, one must rely upon the trust 
framework or other nonlegal frameworks for ensuring that collection 
museum management renders decisions that benefit the public. 
Second, these policies may lack practical enforcement mechanisms.
Although enforcement of the policies may cause a museum to lose its 
accreditation status, it will not allow a contestant to veto a sale of a 
work of art or to block an expansion of a collection museum.83 Though 
application of a trust standard of care, along with enhanced nonlegal 
constraints, might serve as a check on museum management’s decisions 
with regards to collection museum expansion, the decisions ultimately
remain the museum’s and the museum’s alone—under the trust 
standard of care, the public remains powerless and voiceless. Even with
these proposed fixes to the trust system, the public would remain 
woefully uninvolved in important decisions regarding the alteration of 
collection museums. A new legal framework is required.
III. THE PREFERABLE APPROACH: THE PROPERTY LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK
Part II has proven that the trust-based legal framework is 
inadequate to satisfy all of the competing interests in a collection
museum. However, the question remains: What is the appropriate 
framework for these institutions? As previously mentioned, collection
museums occupy a liminal position in the public–private property 
binary, beginning as private property of the collector but subsequently 
evolving into institutions in service of the public. As an alternative to 
adhering to the current trust-based legal system, property law emerges 
as a preferable governance regime for collection museums. This 
framework provides a more appropriate balance between private and
public interests, maintaining management’s authority to make 
necessary alterations to the institution while simultaneously 
enfranchising the public and enabling it to participate in any proposed 
expansion in a timely manner. 
This Part explores the different considerations of a property-based 
legal regime. Section A begins by analyzing collection museums 
through the lens of public property doctrines, including the public trust 
83. Cf. AAM Press Release, supra note 81 (explaining that AAM had authority to remove
the museum’s accreditation status but that the impermissible deaccessioning had already 
occurred).
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doctrine and the public dedication doctrine. However, it determines 
that these public property doctrines prove an imperfect fit for the
specific concerns implicated when collection museums seek to expand.
Section B then argues that collection museums should be understood 
as “qualified property” that are subject to historic preservation 
ordinances, contending that these regulations provide the most 
suitable mechanism for balancing museum management’s and the
public’s needs in the context of a collection museum’s expansion 
proposal. 
A. Collection Museums Through the Lens of Public Property 
Doctrines: The Public Trust Doctrine and the Public Dedication 
Doctrine
Because collection museums exist to serve the public, they could
arguably be conceived of as public property. However, when public 
property doctrines, specifically the public trust doctrine and the public 
dedication doctrine, are applied to collection museums, it becomes 
evident that these doctrines fail to fit the specific needs and concerns 
raised by collection museums. 
1. The Public Trust Doctrine. In its original conception, the public 
trust doctrine embodied the principle that “navigable waters are
preserved for the public use, and that the state is responsible for 
protecting the public’s right to the use.”84 At first blush, the public trust 
doctrine would seem a viable option for collection museums since art 
is perceived as being held in the public trust85—a perception that is 
confirmed by museum professionals.86 If one views a museum’s
building and landscape setting as works of art in their own right, then
one could extend the public trust concept to the museum’s building and 
landscape setting. 
84. Public-Trust Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). This doctrine is often
confused with charitable trusts, which are trusts “created to benefit a specific charity, specific
charities, or the general public rather than a private individual or entity.” Charitable Trust,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
85. For example, the New York Board of Regents defines public trust as “the responsibility 
of [museums and historical societies with collections] to carry out activities and hold their assets
in trust for the public benefit.” N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8 § 3.27(a)(18) (2018).
 86. See Ford W. Bell,  Opinion, Museum Art, Held in Trust, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/31/opinion/lweb31museums.html [https://perma.cc/77LP-
K9WB] (expressing the view of the president of AAM that “once an object falls under the aegis
of a museum, it is held in the public trust, to be accessible to present and future generations”).
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However, the appeal of applying the public trust doctrine in the 
art museum context is not coterminous with the legal conception of the 
public trust. The public trust doctrine has been invoked in the 
environmental context, such as cases involving navigable waters87 and
other natural resources.88 To be sure, the public trust doctrine possesses 
the advantage of conferring standing to sue upon the state or any 
citizen of the state to enforce the public trust,89 enabling more 
stakeholders to challenge an expansion proposal in the collection
museum context.90 However, the doctrine’s availability in the 
collection museum context is contingent upon the substantive
expansion in the scope of the public trust doctrine beyond the 
environmental context to include cultural institutions, cultural 
property, and works of art.91 Such an extension, however, is highly
unlikely, as application of the doctrine beyond the environmental 
context has gained little traction and has even been rejected by some
courts.92 Moreover, the museum world employs the term “public trust”
not only in the legal sense but also in a moral sense as a shorthand for 
87. The Supreme Court first invoked the public trust doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad Co.
v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), which struck down the Illinois legislature’s effort to cede title over
Lake Michigan to a private railroad on the ground that the waters and land were “held in trust
for the people.” Id. at 452. 
88. Professor Joseph Sax’s pivotal article argued that the doctrine could serve as a legal tool
“for citizens seeking to develop a comprehensive legal approach to resource management
problems” regarding the environment. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural
Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 474 (1970). Since Professor
Sax’s article, the doctrine has successfully been invoked in numerous environmental challenges.
See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1983) (holding that the 
public trust doctrine applies to flowing waters and water rights); Borough of Neptune City v.
Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47, 55 (N.J. 1972) (citing Professor Sax’s article to hold
that the public trust doctrine may be called upon to protect recreational use of trust resources,
including coastal beaches).
89. Under the public trust doctrine, a citizen’s standing to sue empowers any person “to
invoke the doctrine, and effectively confers enforcement authority on nonprofit advocacy
groups.” Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, Private Rights in Public Lands: The Chicago
Lakefront, Montgomery Ward, and the Public Dedication Doctrine, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1417, 1420
(2011). 
90. For example, advocacy groups, such as preservationists, artists, architects, and neighbors,
could challenge a collection museum’s expansion under the doctrine.
 91. See Patty Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural
Property in the United States, 75 B.U. L. REV. 559, 647 (1995) [hereinafter Gerstenblith, Identity 
and Cultural Property] (“The public trust doctrine is the most appropriate legal doctrine for
explaining the public interest and for protecting the rights of a cultural group in its cultural
property.”).
 92. See, e.g., Cathedral Church of St. John the Divine v. Dormitory Auth., 645 N.Y.S.2d 637,
642–43 (App. Div. 1996) (rejecting extension of public trust doctrine to include a neighborhood
green space).
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“the trust and confidence that the public has given to the museum to
collect, preserve, and make available works of art.”93 The appeal to the
public trust doctrine in the collection museum context may be “mere 
incantation”—“[m]useum collections simply are not held in the public 
trust” in the legal, doctrinal sense.94 
2. The Public Dedication Doctrine. Although the public trust
doctrine remains an unavailing option for the public to challenge a 
collection museum’s proposal for expansion, the public dedication
doctrine presents another viable option to challenge such expansion.
The doctrine of public dedication was developed by American courts 
in the nineteenth century to provide equitable relief to private property 
owners who could seek injunctive relief before any public land that 
abutted their property was changed.95 To qualify for this relief, the land 
subject to change had to have been dedicated to the public, and certain 
individuals have to demonstrate their reliance interests.96 Applying the 
doctrine in the case of collection museums, the founding collector’s 
decision to open her home or privately owned property as a museum
for the public may be viewed as an offer to dedicate her property to the
public use, and the public’s visitation of the museum would qualify as
acceptance of this public dedication.97 Because a collection museum is 
often the founding collector’s home, situated within a neighborhood, 
private property owners in the neighborhood may possess reliance 
interests that the collection museum would not substantially alter the 
neighborhood’s aesthetic.  
Although both doctrines function as means of preserving spaces 
intended for public uses, the doctrines differ in important respects.98 
93. Sara Tam, Note, In Museums We Trust: Analyzing the Mission of Museums,
Deaccessioning Policies, and the Public Trust, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849, 860–63 (2012)
(discussing public trust theories in the museum context).
 94. See Donn Zaretsky, There’s No Such Thing as the Public Trust, and It’s a Good Thing,
Too, in THE LEGAL GUIDE FOR MUSEUM PROFESSIONALS 151, 153 (Julia Courtney ed., 2015)
(discussing the public trust doctrine in the deaccessioning context).
95. Kearney & Merrill, supra note 89, at 1418, 1449. 
96. Id.
97. The public dedication doctrine drew upon contract law, requiring an offer by the owner 
of his property to the public and acceptance by the public. Id. at 1449 (noting that offer and 
acceptance may be through words or inferred from the course of conduct of either the grantor or
the public).
 98. See id. at 1419–20 (noting that “[t]he public trust doctrine seeks to preserve public spaces
by positing that certain resources are held in a restricted title that disables any transfer of these
resources into the hands of private owners,” whereas the public dedication doctrine confers the 
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Though the public trust doctrine has been limited in scope to navigable
waters and environmental subjects, it broadly confers standing upon 
either the state or any interested person. Contrarily, the public
dedication doctrine covers a potentially broader range of public spaces 
but limits standing to a smaller subset of the public: neighboring
landowners who can demonstrate reliance interests.99 The wider scope
of the public dedication doctrine appears to make it a more effective 
legal tool for certain members of the public to challenge a collection 
museum’s expansion. As discussed below, however, certain drawbacks 
disable the doctrine from doing substantive work in the collection 
museum context. 
Though the public dedication doctrine’s scope is larger than that 
of the public trust doctrine, it still seems insufficient to cover collection 
museums because the public dedication doctrine is typically invoked
with regard to parks or other public spaces.100 It would be difficult to
broaden the doctrine’s scope to include collection museums, even if the 
expansion is on a park or green space, because the expansions are on 
private property. Furthermore, by limiting standing to a finite number 
of private property owners, the public dedication doctrine has 
additional disadvantages. First, the doctrine can function as “a
unanimous consent mechanism”: if the private property owners who
have standing to sue instead consent to the collection museum’s 
expansion, the expansion proceeds without challenge.101 Conversely, if 
the private property owners abuse their standing, they might 
effectively exercise a veto and stymie the collection museum’s 
legitimate expansion. Second, not all neighbors will have the same 
stake or interest in the public land, and the doctrine depends on some
owners having “unusually large stakes” to function as an effective 
enforcement mechanism.102 Third, the preferences of abutting
right upon “a select group of landowners uniquely affected by public spaces to sue in equity to
prevent departures from the dedicated use”).
 99. See id. at 1420 (naming “a much wider range” of resources to which the doctrine could 
be applied and describing neighbors as “individuals who have a strong interest in maintaining the 
public nature of the resource”).
 100. See, e.g., President of Cincinnati v. Lessee of White, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 431 (1832) (involving
the dedication of a tract of land along the Ohio River).
 101. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 89, at 1512 (discussing this consent mechanism of the 
public dedication doctrine).
 102. Id. at 1525. For example, contiguous property owners or owners whose views would be
blocked by expansion may have a greater interest in obtaining equitable relief and therefore 
would be more willing to pursue a legal remedy. On the other hand, if all neighboring owners
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landowners and of the general public may diverge.103 In the collection
museum context, while the general public might prefer more exhibition 
space for activities and programming events, neighboring property 
owners may disfavor expansion that would disrupt their peace and
quiet. Conversely, neighbors might prefer an expansion that would
increase their own property values, even if the general public might 
prefer preservation of the museum’s original building and landscape
setting. These conflicting views indicate how a public dedication
doctrine that relies on the immediate neighboring property owners 
challenging the expansion might not always serve the interests of the 
general public. 
* * * 
In sum, application of the public property doctrines to collection
museums appears to be too strained of an exercise. Flatly, these 
doctrines are insufficient legal frameworks for collection museums, 
and this Section has indicated that collection museums cannot viably
be analyzed under a pure public property framework.  
B. Collection Museums as “Qualified Property”: Preservation 
Restrictions and Historic Preservation Ordinances 
Since the expansion of collection museums cannot effectively be 
regulated through a public property framework, one must turn to the 
mechanisms, laws, and doctrines applicable to private property.
Although collection museums cannot be viewed as public property, as
discussed above, should one analyze collection museums as private 
property? To begin, the founding collectors did not consider 
themselves purely private owners: many perceived themselves as
stewards of their collections with duties to preserve them and provide
access for the public.104 Therefore, the founding collectors did not 
consider themselves as purely private owners who possessed “all the
rights of exclusivity that go with conventional ownership.”105 Collection 
museums, as an outgrowth of founding collectors’ efforts, are hybrid
properties—private in origin but public in mission—and do not fall 
cleanly under either a private property or public property framework.
have relatively equal and small stakes, it may prove challenging to form a coalition of owners,
who could share litigation costs. Id. at 1525–26.
 103. See id. at 1526 (observing that private owners and the public are likely to agree on 
“whether to maintain a public space or permit it to be privatized” but otherwise likely to diverge
in their interests). 
104. See SAX, supra note 11, at 68–69; Temin, supra note 32, at 184.
 105. SAX, supra note 11, at 68. 
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More generally, cultural property blurs the distinction between public
and private property, undermining a public–private binary conception
of property rights.106 Because “[c]onventional notions of ownership
and dominion are unable to provide adequately for public access,
openness, and preservation,” collection museums may require a 
reconceptualization of the public–private property rights dichotomy.107 
Instead of subscribing to the public–private binary structure, if one 
conceives of property rights of both collectors and collection museums 
as functioning along a continuum, collection museums may appear to
constitute “a species of qualified ownership founded on the recognition 
that some objects [including art collections as well as their buildings 
and surroundings] . . . are constituent of a community, and that 
ordinary private dominion over them insufficiently accounts for the
community’s rightful stake in them.”108 In this continuum, collection 
museums should be understood as “qualified property,” neither wholly 
public nor wholly private. 
Of course, reconceptualizing property rights as a continuum 
complicates the difficulty of identifying substitutes for the prevailing
public–private property rules, which have the virtue of clarity. Despite
this difficulty, the law can—and should—provide means by which the 
public can voice its interests, while still ensuring that collection 
museums’ private property rights are not completely subrogated to the
public’s interest.109 As such, this Section examines currently available 
methods for private property to account for public concern— 
preservation restrictions and preservation ordinances—ultimately
arguing that preservation ordinances achieve the best balance between 
the public’s needs and the collection museum’s autonomy.  
1. Preservation Restrictions. Preservation restrictions, which are 
created by state statute, resemble common law servitudes and
106. See Nivala, supra note 16, at 531 (pointing to statutes that protect “historic buildings,
antiquities, and artist’s moral rights” as evidence of a “collective public heritage” in cultural
property (quoting Nicole B. Wilkes, Public Responsibilities of Private Owners of Cultural
Property: Toward a National Art Preservation Statute, 24 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 177, 179 
(2001))). 
107. SAX, supra note 11, at 197. Sax argues that private art owners should not have a “right of 
destruction as against the public” and that private art collectors have an affirmative duty to
provide access to their art. Id. at 68.
 108. See id. at 197 (calling for recognition of the concept of qualified ownership).
109. For example, Professor Patty Gerstenblith argues that the architect’s rights in the
building are impeded when a building is landmarked. Patty Gerstenblith, Architect as Artist:
Artists’ Rights and Historic Preservation, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 431, 462 (1994). 














     
  
 
   
  
 
     
  
 
   
  
2020] CONSTRUCTING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK 1417
easements.110 Specifically, a private property owner voluntarily places 
restrictions on the development of, or changes to, his or her property
and then transfers those restrictions to a nonprofit organization or 
government agency in exchange for certain benefits, such as federal
and state tax deductions or credits.111 In the collection museum context,
preservation restrictions would allow museum management to 
preserve a greater measure of autonomy because these restrictions are 
voluntary. Management would control which property rights it would 
transfer to the local government, such as exterior modifications,
thereby enabling the museum to meet its institutional goals and needs, 
specifically through interior maintenance and minor modifications. 
Preservation restrictions could also check a collection museum’s 
expansion efforts by requiring judicial or legislative oversight and
approval. 
However, preservation restrictions ultimately do not accomplish 
the goal of balancing the needs of museum management and the public. 
First, the voluntary nature of preservation restrictions provides little 
incentive for museums to buy into the process. Because collection 
museums already receive tax benefits as nonprofit organizations,112 the
likelihood that these museums would voluntarily cede property rights 
without acquiring some additional benefit is questionable. Moreover,
the fact that preservation restrictions exist in perpetuity113 also 
mitigates their appeal to a collection museum that may want the option
of expanding in the future. To combat these shortcomings, local 
governments could be more forceful, such as by conditioning future tax 
benefits on a collection museum’s compliance with preservation 
restrictions. Such a condition, however, may be unconstitutionally 
coercive.114 Even if protective restrictions were adopted and provided 
110. See SARA C. BRONIN & RYAN ROWBERRY, HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW IN A
NUTSHELL 412 (2014) (noting that “[r]estrictions are sometimes known by the common law terms
of ‘servitudes,’ ‘easements,’ or ‘covenants,’ which are often used interchangeably”).
 111. Id. at 411. However, restrictions can also be imposed on property owners through
exactions. Id. at 416. 
112. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
 113. See Gerald Korngold, Semida Munteanu & Lauren Elizabeth Smith, An Empirical Study 
of Modification and Termination of Conservation Easements: What the Data Suggest About 
Appropriate Legal Rules, 24 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 18 (2016) (discussing the perpetuity
requirement for conservation easements and the possibility of modifying conservation
easements).
 114. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 575–89 (2012) (concluding
that Medicaid expansion in Affordable Care Act violated the Spending Clause by coercing the
states into accepting its terms). 
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1418 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1391
a meaningful check on a museum’s expansion, such restrictions still 
would not permit public involvement: the museum would only be 
checked by the legislature and the courts. Thus, although a protective
restriction does endow the collection museum with a greater measure
of autonomy, the likelihood that a museum would voluntarily impose
preservation restrictions upon itself, coupled with the inability of the 
public to participate in fashioning and oversight of these restrictions,
renders them an ineffective solution.  
2. Preservation Ordinances. Unlike the voluntary nature of 
preservation restrictions, preservation ordinances seek to regulate land 
through legislation that is promulgated and enforced by governments, 
thereby subjecting collection museums to public governance.115 
Preservation legislation may consist of registration of landmarks,
which is often modeled upon the National Register of Historic Places,
or enabling legislation, which confers the state’s police power on local 
governments to regulate the preservation of historic private property 
by establishing landmark commissions and promulgating preservation 
ordinances.116 Because preservation ordinances focus on property 
aesthetics, they serve a protective function to prevent “destruction, 
inappropriate alteration, and neglect” of significant historic 
resources.117 Though preservation ordinances may substantively 
restrict private property rights, these ordinances also establish 
mechanisms and processes through which private property owners and
the public can resolve issues relating to the particular property.118 Thus,
in the case of collection museums, preservation ordinances provide the 
most efficacious means for balancing the collection museum’s interests 
with those of the public. The remainder of this Part will discuss the 
mechanics of these ordinances and their application in the collection 
museum context.
115. See  BRONIN & ROWBERRY, supra note 110, at 191–92 (discussing preservation 
ordinances and localities’ authority to impose them as derived from state statutes). Zoning
ordinances also regulate land. Whereas zoning ordinances focus on building uses by categorizing
land into different zones and thereby separating incompatible uses, historic preservation
ordinances focus on property aesthetics. Id. at 208–09. 
116. Scott H. Rothstein, Comment, Takings Jurisprudence Comes In from the Cold: 
Preserving Interiors Through Landmark Designation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1105, 1108–09 (1994). 
117. BRONIN & ROWBERRY, supra note 110, at 1.
 118. Id. For example, preservation ordinances may balance historic preservation with other 
values such as “individual property rights, architectural design innovations, free speech, cultural
identity, access for persons with disabilities, and economic development.” Id. 
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2020] CONSTRUCTING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK 1419
a. The Mechanics of Historic Preservation Ordinances. Though the 
content regulated by historic preservation ordinances varies 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, their procedural processes are remarkably
similar. To designate a resource as a historic site, the resource must be 
nominated and then evaluated by the relevant governing council to
determine if it meets the jurisdiction’s applicable criteria.119 After a
resource has been designated, it will be subject to the locality’s historic 
preservation ordinances, which generally can limit or delay demolition
of all or part of historic properties, restrict new construction within
historic districts, or prevent alterations to historic properties.120 When
a property owner files for a building permit to alter an aspect of the 
designated property, this filing triggers review by the local government,
who must determine whether the proposed alterations are compatible 
with the historic aspects of the property before issuing a certificate of 
appropriateness.121 During this process, the local government will 
typically hold a public meeting and apply its criteria for 
appropriateness before voting on the application.122 If the local
government issues a certificate of appropriateness, the property owner 
is then able to obtain the building permit.123 
b. Historic Preservation Ordinances and Collection Museums. In
considering whether to apply historic preservation ordinances to
expansion proposals for collection museums, Chief Justice124 
Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. 
New York City,125 a Supreme Court case that upheld the
119. See BRONIN & ROWBERRY, supra note 110, at 202–03 (discussing the nomination and
evaluation process); see also 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2019) (providing criteria for federal designation on
the National Register of Historic Places). 
120. See id. at 192–207 (discussing these three types of restrictions). 
121. Id. at 200–02. 
122. Id. at 202–03. 
123. Id. at 199.
124. At the time of the opinion, Rehnquist was then an Associate Justice.
125. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). This case involved the
application of New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law to Grand Central Terminal, a 
designated landmark. After the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission (“the 
Commission”) denied plans to build a multistory office building in the airspace above the 
Terminal, the owners challenged the Commission’s decision, alleging that its application of the
Landmarks Preservation Law constituted an unlawful taking of their property. Id. at 119. In 
addition to holding that there was no regulatory taking, the Court also rejected the owners’
argument that landmark laws were discriminatory, “reverse spot” zoning that “arbitrarily
single[d] out a particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones.”
Id. at 130–32. Instead, the preservation law at issue “embodie[d] a comprehensive plan to preserve 
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1420 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1391
constitutionality of historic preservation ordinances, provides an 
important consideration: historic preservation ordinances might 
disproportionately fall on certain property owners.126 According to
Professor Joseph Sax, Rehnquist’s opinion observed that a property
owner of “something deemed especially valuable to the community, by 
virtue of that fact, and his previous gift of the benefit of that boon to
the neighboring community, has somehow incurred an obligation to 
protect or preserve the object for the benefit of the community.”127 A 
property owner of a designated historical property has “an affirmative 
duty to preserve”—a more intrusive obligation than a negative duty to 
refrain from doing harm.128 Were a collection museum to be designated
a historical venue, it could potentially face this affirmative duty to
preserve its collection and its physical structure. 
Despite the potential burden, preservation ordinances 
nonetheless offer the most suitable vehicle for involving the public in 
the collection-museum-expansion dialogue. As Professor Carol Rose
noted, historic preservation law functions as a “process of community 
self-definition” that “brings neighbors together in mutual education
and mutual aid, helping to prevent a paralyzing sense of individual
powerlessness.”129 Indeed, procedural requirements for alterations of
designated landmarks and historically protected structures require a 
review-and-recommendation process; the release of such a report
should strive to “encourage public discourse and debate.”130 Given 
collection museums’ self-professed desire to serve the public, a 
governance regime like historic preservation ordinances facilitates a 
dialogue between collection museum management and the public, 
giving the latter a voice without completely abrogating the former’s 
autonomy. 
structures of historic or aesthetic interest.” Id. at 132. The Court’s decision reaffirmed that state 
and local governments “may enact land-use restrictions or controls to enhance the quality of life
by preserving the character and desirable aesthetic features of a city [or community].” Id. at 129. 
As a result, “Penn Central has served to effectively insulate historic preservation from regulatory
takings challenges,” thereby ensuring that these ordinances are viable methods of regulating
collection museums. See J. Peter Byrne, Regulatory Takings Challenges to Historic Preservation
Laws After Penn Central, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 316 (2004).
 126. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
 127. SAX, supra note 11, at 57.
 128. Id.
129. Carol M. Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic
Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 494 (1981).
 130. SAX, supra note 11, at 52. 
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2020] CONSTRUCTING A LEGAL FRAMEWORK 1421
IV. PROPOSALS FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION ORDINANCES OF 
COLLECTION MUSEUMS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Though historic preservation ordinances strike the best balance of 
all the proposed governance regimes, they could be modified to better 
balance the competing needs of the museum management and the 
public in the context of a collection museum’s proposal to expand. This
Part first discusses potential modifications to historic preservation
ordinances and ultimately concludes that enforcement through delay is 
the most suitable proposal. 
First, collection museums should be brought within the regulatory 
scope of local zoning and preservation commissions, if they are not 
already subject to the locality’s preservation ordinances. Preferably, 
collection museums would consent to designation as a landmark or
property subject to preservation laws, but a collection museum need
not consent in order for such ordinances to apply.131 Additionally, if a
collection museum does not consent to designation as a landmark, local 
ordinances could be expanded in scope to apply not only to registered 
properties but also to nominated properties. Since local and state 
governments permit a broad range of individuals to nominate 
properties for historic preservation protection,132 individuals could
nominate collection museums and, in turn, attempt to bring them
under the ordinance’s scope. 
A natural corollary to this proposal is to consider the scope of the 
landmark designation: whether it should regulate the collection
museum’s exterior, interior, or both. Though historical preservation of 
building exteriors is more common than preservation of building
interiors, courts have held that interiors may be designated as
131. See Gerstenblith, Identity and Cultural Property, supra note 91, at 655–56 (listing due 
process as one potential challenge that could be brought against protective legislation like historic
preservation ordinances); United Artists’ Theater Circuit, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612, 614
(holding that, under Pennsylvania’s constitution, “designation of a building as historic without the 
consent of the owner is not a ‘taking’ that requires just compensation”), vacating United Artists’
Theater Circuit, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6, 26–27 (1991) (holding that provisions of the
Philadelphia Code, “which authorize the historic designation of private property . . . without the 
consent of the owner, are unfair, unjust and amount to an unconstitutional taking without just 
compensation”).
 132. BRONIN & ROWBERRY, supra note 110, at 64–65 (noting that nomination on the state
and local level may be submitted by any person, thereby rendering the process more open to
direct engagement and citizen participation); cf. 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2019) (providing that a state or
tribal historic preservation officer, a federal preservation officer, or the Keeper of the National
Register must make the nomination for federal designation on the National Register of Historic
Places).
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landmarks without constituting a taking of property.133 Indeed, 
“cultural and historic landmarks [like collection museums] are often
more significant for their interiors than for their exteriors.”134 Although 
one could propose landmark designation of collection museum
interiors as a means of further limiting museum management’s
discretion, such a proposal raises practical issues because interior 
spaces are functionally used and often need to be renovated.135 
Additionally, in the case of efforts to renovate landmarked interiors,
compliance with regulations can be both time consuming and 
expensive.136 Thus, necessary—even minimal—renovations to a 
landmarked interior would often be extremely burdensome if 
management had to seek approval every time from the governing
preservation commission.  
Instead, the most efficacious proposals for revisions to current 
preservation ordinances would involve procedural rather than 
substantive changes. Rather than proposing a uniform set of criteria
for local ordinance commissions dealing with collection museums,
which would not account for the jurisdictional variation, this Note
proposes that preservation ordinances should implement procedures 
that delay a collection museum’s approval for expansion plans for a
specified period of time—a method known as “enforcement through
delay.” In addition to serving as a strategic tactic, the power of delay 
facilitates dialogue between the collection museum and the 
community. For example, Professor Rose argues that a preservation 
ordinance can be “community conscious” and “might better be 
133. See Nicholas Caros, Note, Interior Landmarks Preservation and Public Access, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1783–86 (2016) (chronicling the legal challenges to interior landmarking,
such as Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of America v. City of New York, 586 N.Y.S.2d 262 (App. 
Div. 1992), which upheld the designation of interior architectural features as a landmark under
New York City’s Landmarks Preservation Law).
 134. Rothstein, supra note 116, at 1130. 
135. For example, the lobby floors of the former New York Central Railroad headquarters, a
landmarked interior since 1987, require monthly cleaning and polishing—a level of care that is
“not an inexpensive venture”—in order to comply with interior landmark requirements. C. J.
Hughes, The Tricky Task of Renovating a Building Without Altering Its Landmark Insides, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 22, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/23/realestate/commercial/the-tricky-
task-of-renovating-a-buildings-landmark-interior.html [https://perma.cc/AH5K-FXKG] (quoting 
Brian Robin, chief operating officer of one of the buildings). According to Robert B. Tierney,
then-chairman of the New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, interior designations
“are more carefully conferred” than exterior landmark designations. Id.
136. For example, the modernization of the Empire State Building’s lobby, a landmarked
interior, required two years and $20 million as well as approval for the addition of security
cameras, turnstiles, and an information desk. Id.
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enforced through a delay of the owner’s proposed changes than 
through absolute prohibition of demolition or alteration.”137 As
Professor Rose notes, enforcement through delay would transform 
landmark preservation into a “function of community education and 
community pressure”138 that gives “all sides an opportunity to publicize
their positions and to hear the positions of others . . . [and] the 
opportunity to educate the other and to educate the public about the 
community values at stake in the preservation of old structures or in 
their replacement by other structures.”139 
Enforcement-through-delay procedures should also provide 
additional opportunities for community influence, such as through 
public hearings and notice-and-comment procedures. Such
opportunities for community dialogue are invaluable: members of the 
immediate community or neighborhood may have a better sense of the 
worth of the neighborhood, and these opportunities “can strengthen 
the neighborhood, encourage self-definition, and give leverage with
the larger community.”140 
Granted, delaying a collection museum’s proposed changes 
imposes time and monetary costs. Additionally, delaying a collection 
museum’s expansion might generate collateral consequences, such as
impacting its operations and program offerings. For example, if a
collection museum is seeking expansion because its facilities cannot 
physically accommodate a high number of visitors, the museum might 
have to limit the number of participants in educational programs or use 
timed-ticket admission procedures to limit the number of visitors in the
museum. Such drawbacks undercut the collection museum’s purpose
and existence in service of the public. To mitigate some of these 
concerns, the composition of the local historical board could be
modified to better account for the collection museum’s institutional 
needs; a museum professional, in addition to architects, real estate 
developers, and other professionals, could serve on the commission’s 
board to provide additional perspectives and generate creative
solutions to such collateral consequences. Furthermore, the 
commission could provide a provision that would allow a “landmark 
owner to argue that other pressing community needs outweigh the 
137. Rose, supra note 129, at 503.
 138. Id. at 504.
 139. Id. at 503–04. 
140. Id. at 534.
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need for exact retention of an older structure,”141 thereby providing a 
collection museum with a means of expediting decision-making by the 
commission in certain circumstances. 
Despite the potential costs, enforcement through delay brings the
collection museum’s management and interested members of the
public “into contact so that they may refine and publicize public 
purposes at stake in a project, weigh considerations of the physical 
environment against competing social goals, and perhaps devise an 
accommodation.”142 Though neither the museum management nor the
public acts as the final decision-maker under this framework, the 
enforcement-through-delay methodology ensures that the ultimate
decision-maker—the commission—hears both the museum’s and
public’s concerns and bears these in mind in rendering a decision.143 
CONCLUSION
As private museums in service of the public, collection museums 
occupy a liminal position, falling outside of both the public and private 
museum governance systems. As a result, any decision to alter or
modify the collection museum or its structure has profound 
implications for both private and public stakeholders. The legal
framework that governs how these institutions operate should take into
account their unique public–private nature. In determining whether a 
purely private governance system, derived from trust law, or a public 
governance system, grounded in historic preservation ordinances,
provides a more efficacious framework, one must strive to preserve the
museum management’s autonomy to effectuate its institutional 
mission while also providing an opportunity for the public to exercise 
its droit patrimoine—a right to participate in its cultural inheritance.144 
Ultimately, historic preservation laws, coupled with an enforcement-
through-delay procedural strategy, strike the appropriate balance,
providing both time and opportunity for the public to be heard without 
letting the tyranny of the majority hamper a collection museum’s 
efficient operation. 
141. Id. at 503.
 142. Id. at 533.
143. Rose argues that “just as important as the point ‘where the buck stops,’ however, is the
route that the buck takes. A route through neighborhood and community groups is in keeping 
with preservation’s emerging communitarian purpose. Such a route substantially aids the ultimate
decisionmaker and helps to strengthen pluralistic government.” Id. at 534. 
144. See Nivala, supra note 16, at 481 (defining the goals of droit patrimone as “preserving the
authenticity of and protecting access to our cultural inheritance”).
